

Correlation between Social Capital and Political Participation: Considering National Economic, Political Development, and Economic Inequality

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This article examines the correlation between social, capital and political participation, and tries to demonstrate relationships between macro variables – economic-political development, and economic inequality - and political participation. Furthermore, this article uses interaction terms between macro variables and social capital in order to reveal moderation effects of macro variables.

Results show that social capital which consists of general trust, confidence in the government and civic participation has to do with institutional(voting) and non-institutional(signing a petition, boycotting, taking part in a peaceful demonstration) political participation. Also, macro variables generally magnify effects between social capital and political participation. Macro variables' directions and relationships with political participation suggest that rapid changes in public value have led the public to participate in direct activism, and that institutions have had trouble reflecting these changes.

The findings indicate that social capital correlates with political participation depending on the social context, in terms of social capital theory. Also, it is important with respect to research methodology that this article tries to connect macro-micro variables utilizing Hierarchical Linear Model (HLM), and reveal that social level variables contribute to individual level variables through other individual variables.

Introduction

Political participation has long drawn many researchers' interests because it has been considered a necessary factor in making society better. Political participation is a media, through which citizens can claim their opinions toward policy makers, and also press them to reflect citizens' interest (Dahl 1989; Verba et al. 1995). Warren (2002) even pointed out that "political participation should be thought not as moral require or opportunity for development, but as strategic necessity."

Along with Tocqueville (2003), interested in "The Habit of the Heart" among Americans, which means that solutions for social problems come out through forums like Townhall meetings at New England, there are many prior studies on political participation (Almond and Verba 1963; Verba and Nie 1972; Huntington and Nelson 1976; Verba et al. 1978; Verba et al. 1995; Dalton 2010[2006]). These studies have explained political participation mainly focusing on socioeconomic conditions like age and education or culture and values. Although researchers had known that "the social" contributed to political participation, they measured and explained it with ambiguous concepts. After Putnam (1993;2000;2005) conceptualized social capital at the community level, the correlation between "the social" and political participation was able to be examined with a more clear concept; social capital.

Since then, studies on the relationship between social capital - defined as trust, the norm of reciprocity, and a network - and political participation have increased exponentially. Many researchers reported that social capital has positive effects on various kinds of political participation (Putnam 1993;1995;2000; Brehm and Rahn 1997; Uslaner 1999; Norris 2001; Mishler and Rose, 2005). Yet there are studies showing that social capital has no effect or negative effects on political participation, depending on its type (Park 2006).

These seemingly contradictory results seem to be originated in the fact that these studies had a limited perspective concentrating on individual level variables, neglecting social level variables. Given that political participation is affected not only by individual level variables but also by macro-level variables, additional research is necessary. Also, there is scant research dealing with micro-macro interaction, specifically social capital working in a macro context, due to the failure of considering social level variables.

Based on these research necessities, this article tries to examine 1) the relationship between social capital and political participation 2) national variables' impact on political participation, and 3) the effect of interaction between state-level variables and social capital on political participation. This paper deals with economic ·political development and economic inequality as state-level variables.

The next section conceptualizes social capital and political participation, and reviews theories and prior research on the relationship between social capital and political participation. The following section discusses data, definition of variables, and methodology. Finally, I will answer research questions through hierarchical linear modeling.

Theoretical Background and Previous Studies

Social Capital

Social Capital, which was invented respectively by Bourdieu and Coleman, was a concept demonstrating relationships among individuals that has positive effects on education and status attainment (Bourdieu 1986; Coleman 1988). The definition of social capital is different from one researcher to another, but generally researchers reached a consensus that “social capital stands for the ability of actors to secure benefits by virtue of membership in social networks or other social structures” (Portes 1998).

Putnam developed the social capital concept by changing its unit of analysis from individual to community (Putnam 1993; 2000). Based mainly on Coleman's concept, Putnam extended its range to political and cultural domains with Rousseau-Tocqueville's perspective on civil society (Kim 2004). According to Putnam (1993; 2000), social capital refers to an attribute of social organization, which enhances social efficiencies by promoting cooperative behaviors. Social capital of a community, which consist of a network, trust, and the norm of reciprocity, has to do with democracy, economic development, security, public health and happiness. Social capital helps to solve communal problems, facilitate the community's activities, enhance the community through sharing various experiences, and share useful information.

This article conceptualizes social capital as trust and a network, developing Putnam's concept. Among them, trust can be broke down into two categories: personal trust and institutional trust (Pagden 1988; Yee 1998; Lee 1998; Sztompka 1999; Khodyakov 2007). Institutional trust is a double-edged sword on social development, because it means support for the current institution. If institutions represented by the government pursue schemes which are helpful for social development, the support of people with high institutional trust would result in positive effects on social development. However, if

institutions implement negative policies on social development, supporting the current institutions may do harm for society.

Political Participation

Political participation became one of the research interests as it has turned from exclusive behavior of small elites, into one of public action. In their seminal study, Verba and Nie (1972) thought pro-institution behavior in which citizens elect policy makers, or make petitions to influence a decision-making process as political participation. On the contrary, Weiner (1971) included all volunteer actions to influence public policy, administration, and policy makers, which made political participation include behaviors outside of the current system. Going one step forward, Huntington and Nelson (1976) saw even mobilized participation as one type of political participation. Based on these prior conceptualizations, this article defines political participation as volunteer or mobilized actions which intend to exert their influence on decision makers whether or not these are legal.

Political participation can be primarily divided into a vote and participation not related to a vote. Verba and his colleagues (1978) categorized political participation as a vote, a campaign, a contact with decision-makers, a civic engagement according to the type of influence, the extent of conflict, necessary efforts, and cooperation with others. On top of that, Dalton (2006) mentioned contentious politics and an internet activism. Marien and her colleagues (2010) distinguished institutional and non-institutional participation depending on whether or not it belongs to a political system. Institutional participation relates to a vote, taking part in political rallies and joining parties, which directly affects elected officials. On the other hand, non-institutional participation refers to behaviors trying to affect political processes indirectly, including signing petitions, boycotts, and demonstrations. This article divides political participation as institutional and non-institutional participation following Marien and her colleagues' conceptualization, and examines relationships with individual variables respectively.

Prior research on the causes of political participation can be broadly broken into three parts: Socio-psychological approach, resource mobilization approach and political opportunity approach (Tarrow 1998; Lim 1999, Hong 2004; Dalton et al. 2010). First, the socio-psychological approach defines society as a group of people having satisfied or unsatisfied desires and expectations. It means that their unit of analysis is not a social system or structure, but an individual. Researchers in this tradition argued that social complaints or relative deprivation lead people to participate in political process. According to their arguments, discriminated and unsatisfied people tend to participate more because they have more social constraints and relative deprivation than other people. At the social level, the deeper socio-economic inequality, the more people politically participate.

Second, resource mobilization theory refers to the 'instrumental rationality model' that resources such as capital and manpower affect political participation (Shin 2007). In this approach, movements' organizational structure and strategy become the center of an argument. According to this theory, political participation is a rational behavior and its purpose depends on conflicts of interests, which arise among institutional authority relationships. Also, political participation stems from resources, organization and changes in opportunities. For example, the advent of the civil right movements in the U.S. was caused by the urbanization of southern African-American residences, the rising population in the middle and working class, the increase in the university entrance rate of African-Americans, and the expansion of black churches. These changes in turn freed blacks from conventional paternalistic social control, and then enhanced blacks' organizations and resources which resulted in the advent of the civil rights movement (Hong 2004:10~11). If this approach is correct, an

economically developed society would have more vivid political participation, and people who have higher incomes or education levels would join more of the political participations.

Social capital is also able to be a kind of resource. A good example is McAdam (1986), who clarified what aspects facilitated people's involvement in a high-risk movement like the Freedom Summer project. The result showed that a social network and a micro-structural factor play significant roles in mobilizing participants, rather than ideological commitments or personal situations. Gould (1991;1995) also demonstrated that the locally embedded network was the main factor in mobilizing people in the Paris Commune. Han (2009) showed that those who are in the 'hub' of the network played critical roles in the process of the American Revolution by mediating people.

Lastly, political opportunity structure approach (POS) is a theory that the political context of the country shapes political participation (McAdam et al. 1996). To be specific, POS can be broken down into five categories: a division within elites, a regime change, an available opportunity for political organizations in institutional politics, the existence of influential patrons, and the state's repression and attitude toward political participation (Tarrow 1998). Yet, it is still controversial over which POS encourages people to join political participation. There are some scholars arguing that open POS encourages political participation for the following reasons: due to political openness, individuals are able to engage in political issues without the risk of retaliation, and there are appropriate methods for a political approach. Moreover, elites are ready to listen to opinions of civic organizations and the public in open POS (Dalton et al. 2009; Kriesi 1995; Tarrow 1998). On the other hand, some studies concluded that a closed system excludes actors from conventional political behavior, which pushes actors into a non-institutional political movement (Kitschelt 1986; Cuzan 1991). We need to examine which argument is more relevant.

In addition, there are some studies on the relationship between state-level variables and political participation: statism and corporateness (Schofer et al. 2001), GDP, urbanization, and infant fatality rate (Booth and Seligson 2006), GDP per capita and the rule of law (Dalton et al. 2009). Yet, these studies ruled social capital out of the model or simplified social capital as group membership for the purpose of control. Consequently, it is hard to grasp influence changes as a result of the interaction between state-level variables and subcategories of social capital with these studies.

A Mechanism of the Relationship between Social Capital and Political Participation

In order to examine a relationship between social capital and political participation, we need to know how previous research provides the specific mechanism. First of all, trust reduces complexity for individuals while providing them with a sense of security by allowing them to take for granted most of the relationships upon which they depend. These effects not only contribute to well-being in itself, but also enable individuals to expand their horizons of action. (Warren 1999) Also, People voluntarily bear possible risks from uncontrollable behaviors of those in interdependent relations through trust. This trait of trust enables some effects like encouraging cooperation among people in the process of interaction, and making people bear the cost of public goods voluntarily to occur (Park 2004). As far as a relationship with political participation is concerned, it is expected that trust has positive effects on political participation, because people can invest resources which were saved by trust in political behavior.

Similar with other social domains, the political domain also has a lot of risks and uncertainties which the public's political participation has trouble embracing. Hence, we optimize the ways in which we allocate our scarce political resources by trusting elites or institutions (Warren 1999). Yet, if

decision makers consistently ignore the demands of the public, they would start to join various kinds of political participation to voice their demands. As a result, trust in institutions, that is confidence in government, would have different effects depending on the kinds of political participation. While high confidence in government would facilitate institutional political participation like voting, it would curb non-institutional political participation.

Lastly, associations function as a ‘school’ which educate people for civic virtues, encourage the spread of information and promote mobilization. These facts have been proved by empirical research. When individuals are members of community which has a high educational level, they tend to participate more (Helliwell and Putnam 2007; Campbell 2009). Also, people are more likely to become involved in politics when they are asked to do so, especially if the request comes face-to-face from someone they know (Campbell 2013). In the case of situation that people whose social networks include people who knows much about politics, people are more likely to participate in politics as well. (McClurg 2006)

We can see a tendency that as the economy develops, the absolute quantity of resources that people use increases. It is predictable that a rise in available resources increases general trust; consequently non-institutional political participation which requires resources would expand by grown general trust. Furthermore, the number of associations reflecting diversified values might increase with economic development, and in turn those people in these groups would have more information and motivation for direct participation. Meanwhile, economic development is a result of established institutions and government policies, thus it would encourage confidence in the government, which in turn has negative effects on non-institutional political participation that often goes against established institutions.

With respect to economic inequality, a low amount of inequality makes the middle class grow and improves trust in general. Also, as more and more people are able to attain appropriate amounts of resources, people would come to join more associations. Like economic development, low amounts of inequality increase trust level in institutions. Those who have high trust in institutions would be less likely to join political participation than members in highly unequal society.

Lastly, political development means diverse social opinions are allowed, so group membership would increase, and political participation via groups would also increase. Moreover, compared to a closed and authoritative government, an open and democratic government tends to have high legitimacy, which in turn would cause prior influences of confidence in government to be magnified.




Figure 1 - Moderation Effect of Economic Development

<Figure 1> demonstrates how macro variables affect the relationship among micro-level variables. Take economic development as an example. Social capital is contributable to political participation in all countries (solid line); its influence is magnified in economically developed countries (dotted line).

Research hypotheses based on reasoning provided above are the following:

H1) The higher economic and political development level, the lower economic inequality, the higher the positive effects of general trust and group membership, and the higher the negative effects of confidence in government on non-institutional political participation

Institutional political participation such as voting, would have different aspects with non-institutional political participation. This is because unlike non-institutional political participation, the government encourages people to vote and voting does not require significant amount of resources other than participating in demonstrations. Hence confidence in the government might have inverted direction with non-institutional political participation. It is expected that general trust and group membership would have similar mechanisms with non-institutional political participation.

H2) The higher economic and political development level, the lower economic inequality, the higher the positive effects of general trust, group membership, and confidence in government on institutional political participation

Data and Research Method

Data

I used World Values Survey (WVS) 5th wave (2005~2008) to examine the hypotheses. WVS 5th wave contains 48 countries over the world and asked people about general trust, group membership, political participation, etc. Thus, it is relevant data to investigate the relationship between social capital and political participation at the global level. Moreover this data allowed researchers to clarify the correlation between socioeconomic conditions and dependent variables. Sample sizes of statistical models are different for each variable's missing value: 40 countries with 42,276 (non-institutional political participation-economy model), 42 countries with 44,174 (non-institutional political participation-political model), 38 countries with 42,662 (institutional political participation-economy model), and 40 countries with 44,544 (institutional political participation-political model).

Variables

Variables can be largely categorized as control variables, social capital variables, national level variables, and political participation which is the dependent variable. Appendix table 1 and 2 show definitions and measurement of variables, and the descriptive statistics by nations.

Control Variables In order to control effects on the chosen model, socioeconomic factors such as gender, age, marital status, education level, employment status and monthly household income are included. For marital status, he or she is assigned as 'married' if one has a spouse or partner. For education level, I used the highest level of education. Employment status is operationalized by checking whether the respondent is working or not. For income, I used a self-rated income among 1 to 10.

Social Capital As stated above, this study views general trust, institutional trust, and networks as components of social capital. General trust refers to trust in common people, which is operationalized as a binary variable with a response to the question, “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” And the response to the question, “how much confidence do you have in the government?” is used as the representative variable for institutional trust. Next, network is operationalized as group membership that individuals join or had joined. I used questions about the memberships of five kinds of organizations – sports/recreation, art/music/educational, environmental organization, charitable/humanitarian organization, consumer organization – and if the respondent answered “active member” or “inactive member”, I gave 1 point and then combined them (Cronbach's alpha: 0.73).

State-level Variables Economic development, economic inequality, and political development are included in the model, which have been emphasized by literature including relative deprivation theory, resource mobilization theory, and political opportunity structure for an explanation of political participation. GDP per capita is used as economic development, and the gini coefficient is used as economic inequality. These are dichotomized and included in models. Political development means political openness and the degree of democracy, so ‘the rule of law’ in World Governance Indicator (WGI) of the World Bank is used. This is because the rule of law well reflects institutional contexts that repress political dissenters. The rule of law measures how civil and political rights, which are essential for public participation in the political process, are equitably implemented (Dalton et al. 2009). Scores are ranged from -2.5(the weakest) to 2.5(the strongest). This is dichotomized with zero as a criterion. GDP per capita and the rule of law figures in 2005 are selected because WVS 5th wave’s standard year was 2005. Yet, due to this limitation of data, I used the available gini coefficient figures among 2000~2010.

With respect to voting, it is necessary to consider the fact that there are some countries punishing people who do not vote: Australia, Brazil, Peru, Chile, and Turkey are such countries. In this case, punishment is likely to determine whether people vote or not regardless of individual or socioeconomic conditions. Consequently, the presence of punishment on voting is included as binary variable in models to control the effect.

Dependent Variable (Political Participation) The dependent variable is twofold. Whether people voted or not is used as institutional political participation. I gave a score of 1 to people who voted, and 0 to the others. On the other hand, a non-institutional political participation is a composite variable of questions on ‘signing a petition’, ‘joining in boycotts’ and ‘attending peaceful demonstrations’. Possible responses were "have done", "might do", and "would never do", and they are able to be interpreted as the extent to which respondents participate in non-institutional political behavior. Thus, I gave scores of 2, 1, 0 respectively - this resulted in one index, “political participation”, which ranges from 0 to 6 (Cronbach's alpha: 0.78).

Research Method

A unit of analysis of this study is basically an individual who responded to this survey, but this has a methodological problem in that an individual behaves under the influence of society in which he or she is embedded. In this case, applying ordinary linear models such as multiple regression analysis is dangerous in terms of validity. Kang (2005) pointed out that if data having multiple levels are

analyzed as data having a single level, it will result in (1) violation of independence assumption of unit of analysis, (2) variation of a regression coefficient, (3) co-variation, (4) interaction between levels, (5) difficulty in reliability estimation.

Therefore, this study used the hierarchical linear model (HLM). This method is relevant to analyze data having multiple levels since it controls higher level variables by considering them as random effects, so that it can deal with the previously mentioned methodological difficulties (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002; Kang 2005).

The analysis has two different procedures. First, HLM is conducted to identify the fact that social capital variables and national-level variables are correlated with political participation. Second, HLM using the interaction term, is conducted to identify that each countries' economic-political development and economic inequality have moderation effects on the relationship between social capital and political participant. There are two dependent variables so total four models are analyzed. Political development has high collinearity (Coefficient: 0.881. significant in 95% level), so it will be analyzed separately with the economy model.

The basic equation is following:

$$PP_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_1(SES)_{ij} + \beta_2(SC)_{ij} + v_{0j} + v_{1j}(NV)_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij} , \quad - (1)$$

where PP_{ij} is a political participation of an individual i who belongs to a country j , β_0 is an intercept, β_1 , β_2 are coefficient of socioeconomic status (SES) and social capital (SC) respectively, v_{0j} is the societal level impact of a country j on participation, v_{1j} is a coefficient of national level variables (NV) such as GDP per capita, gini coefficient, and political development, and finally ϵ_{ij} is the residual at the individual level. Expression (1) allows us to prove impacts of social capital and national level variables on political participation.

In general, expression (1) has a similar form with expression (2), which is a basic regression equation.

$$PP_{ij} = \alpha + \beta_1(SES)_{ij} + \beta_2(SC)_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij} \quad - (2)$$

$$PP_{ij} = \beta_0 + v_{0j} + v_{1j}(NV)_{ij} + \beta_1(SES)_{ij} + \beta_2(SC)_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij} \quad - (3)$$

In expression (3), $\{\beta_0 + v_{0j} + v_{1j}(NV)_{ij}\}$ replaces α of expression (2). This means that the intercept of final regression equation results from the sum of non-hierarchical regression equation and national level variance.

This expression can be modified as following, with adding interaction terms between national level and social capital variables.

$$PP_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_1(SES)_{ij} + \beta_2(SC)_{ij} + \beta_3(SC \times NV)_{ij} + v_{0j} + v_{1j}(NV)_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij} \quad - (4)$$

National level variables are dummy variables in expression (4), so their impacts on social capital depend on whether national level variables are 0 or 1.

$$\begin{aligned} &\beta_4\{SC + (SC \times NV)\} \text{ (If } NV=1) \\ &\beta_5(SC) \quad \quad \quad \text{(If } NV=0) \end{aligned}$$

Influences of national level variables on the relationship between social capital and political

participation are able to be examined through expressions above.

Distribution of Variables by Country

Social Capital

First variable is social capital. (See appendix table 3 for specific figures) As for trust (figure 2), advanced countries including Norway (0.759) see high level of general trust. The figure 0.759 means that 75.9% of Norwegian “yes” to the question “Do you think most people can be trusted?” Furthermore, figure 2 indicates that Asian people including people in Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand, Japan and Korea trust others above average. Among OECD countries Poland, Slovenia, Mexico, Chile, and Turkey see low level of general trust.

Meanwhile Vietnam is at the top with 3.80 in terms of confidence in government, which can be interpreted as belief in institutions. Given that 3 point is “quite” and 4 point is “completely confident”, most Vietnamese are likely to have belief in their system. Malaysia, Ghana, Mali, Switzerland followed. Peru is at the bottom of the list with 1.80.




Figure 2 - Distribution of General Trust and Confidence in Government by Country

We can see the mix of advanced and developing countries in group membership.(figure 3) As a result of question about having membership of five voluntary association (sports/recreation, art/music/educational, environmental organization, charitable/humanitarian organization, and consumer organization), India ranks first with having 4.39 membership in average, followed by Mali, Ethiopia, Zambia and Ghana. Switzerland, Canada and Sweden see high group membership among advanced countries.

The analysis of Tostensten and his colleagues (2001) shed light on why group membership in African countries is higher than other countries. First of all, urban residents of African countries are under the influence of (1) failure of public services (2) insufficient role of local governments (3) lack of dwelling and jobs (4) environmental problem (5) poor and uneven quality of living. Against this backdrop, community members join and take part in various kinds of associations as a way to survive.

Even though a kind of group varies from church, sports club to burial societies, the essential goal of being members of these organizations is to get as much resources as possible which give them edge in surviving. Those from rural areas, in particular, are likely to join associations for more rapid and smooth settlement in urban environment. Secondly, African urbanites involve in informal group activity to enhance their tie with those having the same hometown. Third, it is ordinary that African governments take advantage of associations to make the public opinion support governments which means that these are voluntary organizations in disguise. These groups urge people to join their groups in order to show off their power, people come to join these groups considering benefits from membership. Finally, there is an impact of racial conflict. Many ethnic groups try to unite their people with making various organizations.

Tostensten and his colleagues' analysis has a limit in that they did not include rural residents, yet it has convincingly proved a significant difference in civic engagement between Western advanced countries and African countries, which suggests we should interpret figures of each nation in context.




Figure 3 - Distribution of Group Membership by Country

National Level Variables

Next, Average GDP per capita (figure 4), meaning economic level of each nation, was \$14,687 in 2005. The highest and the lowest country were Norway (\$47,626) and Ethiopia (\$636). When it comes to a criterion for dividing countries into two groups for a dummy variable, \$15,000 which is close to the average is selected.

Meanwhile, Republic of South Africa saw the highest gini coefficient ($\times 100$) with 63.1, followed by Zambia, Brazil, and Chile. The average was 38.11 and the lowest country was Trinidad and Tobago. The average was used as a criterion to make a dummy variable.

The rule of law (figure 5), which refers to a level of political development, was originally a distribution ranging from -2.5~2.5 in WGI, but I standardized it ranging from 0-1 for the sake of easy understanding of readers. Scandinavian countries including Finland are ranked near the top, while Eastern Europe and African countries in general see low level of political development. Countries from Trinidad and Tobago to Serbia are categorized as countries having low level of political

development.




Figure 4 - Distribution of GDP per capita and Gini Coefficient by Country




Figure 5 - Distribution of the Rule of Law (Political Development) by Country

Political Participation

Finally, with respect to non-institutional political participation, Sweden (3.93), Norway, Italy and Australia are ranked near the top. On the other hand, Asian countries including Thailand (0.55) and Eastern Europe countries turn out to have low level of non-institutional political participation. This regional variance strongly suggests the significant relationship between national level variables and non-institutional political participation.

Countries having high voter turnout (institutional political participation) were Australia (0.96), Thailand, India, Vietnam and Peru from the highest. The figure of 0.96 means that 96% of respondents answered they voted in recent parliamentary elections. The average was 0.78. Countries having mandatory participation in election – Australia, Brazil, and Peru – showed significantly high level of voter turnout, whereas Chile and Turkey showed relatively low voter turnout considering its mandatory voting system.




Figure 6 - Distribution of Institutional and Non-institutional Political Participation by Country

Results

Hierarchical Linear Model on Non-institutional Political Participation

First of all, HLM is conducted by applying non-institutional political participation as the dependent variable (<Table 1>). In model 1, it turns out that all social capital variables significantly correlate with non-institutional political participation. Yet, directions are different. General trust and group membership positively relate with participation, but the more people are confident in the government, the less they participate. With respect to the national-level variable, only economic development is significant.

In model 2, even with the added interaction term, significance and direction of general trust, and group membership's influence are the same as model 1. Yet, significance of confidence in government disappeared. It can be interpreted that confidence in the government has to do with non-institutional political participation depending on social context. The analysis result shows that high economic development positively magnifies social capital variables' positive influences, except confidence in government. It means high GDP per capita not only enhances non-institutional political participation directly, but it also expands indirectly by promoting general trust and participation in associations. This has an implication that more and more people came to have disposable resources as a result of economic development, and it enables people to partake in the political process. The more people have memberships in NGOs, political parties, unions and other casual types of organization, the more they speak on politics, and participate (Putnam 1993;2000). At the societal level, growing disposable resources lead to high participation in associations. Secondly, economic development would bring diversification of social conflicts, which makes it hard for political parties or the government to respond to these diversified needs of the people. In a society where decision makers do not respond to certain social groups, they will try to put pressure on the system by establishing their own organization. That is, it can be said that the result is in accordance with the expectation of resource mobilization approaches.

The interaction term between economic inequality and social capital shows that the negative influence of confidence in government becomes stronger in countries having low inequality level than its counterparts. In other words, people having high confidence in their governments are less likely to have non-institutional political participants in societies with low levels of inequality. This displays that as conflict causing factors diminish, consent on policies and faith in current systems increase, which in turn results in the low necessity of political participation among the public. Consequently, social deprivation theory seems to be reliable at the macro level.

Turning to model 3, which includes political development instead of economic variables, social capital variables' significance and direction is the same as model 1. High general trust and group membership significantly enhances non-institutional political participation, but high confidence in government prevent people from participating. Model 4, taking interaction between political development and social capital into account, shows that political development magnifies the influences of social capital variables. Significance and direction are also stable. It can be concluded that social capital and political development have significant impacts on non-institutional political participation, and expand each other's influences through interaction as well.

**Table 1- Hierarchical Linear Analysis Result by Applying
Non-institutional Political Participation as Dependent Variable**

Variables		Model 1 (Economy Model)	Model 2 (Economy Interactive model)	Model 3 (Political Model)	Model 4 (Political interactive model)	
Control Variables	Sex (Male)	0.184**	0.187**	0.184**	0.185**	
	Age	-0.002**	-0.002**	-0.002**	-0.002**	
	Marital Status (Married)	0.071**	0.069**	0.061**	0.060**	
	Education	0.147**	0.146**	0.148**	0.147**	
	Employment (Employed)	0.195**	0.194**	0.198**	0.197**	
	Income	0.009**	0.008**	0.009**	0.009**	
Social Capital	General Trust	0.179**	0.127**	0.191**	0.076**	
	Confidence in Government	-0.046**	-0.012	-0.050**	-0.028**	
	Group Membership	0.115**	0.099**	0.117**	0.102**	
National- level Variables	Economy Level (High=1)	1.149**	1.020**			
	Economic Inequality (Low=1)	-0.211	-0.014			
	Political Development (High=1)			0.459*	0.477**	
Interaction Term	Economy Level	General Trust		0.203**		
		Confidence In Government		0.023		
		Group Membership		0.035**		
	Economic Inequality	General Trust		-0.057		
		Confidence In Government		-0.075**		
		Group Membership		0.007		
	Political Development	General Trust				0.175**
		Confidence In Government				-0.037**
		Group Membership				0.023**
Constant Term		0.764**	0.712**	0.815**	0.806**	
Random part (State-level) Residual		.624	.616	.763	.756	
Residuals		1.561	1.560	1.567	1.567	
Log Likelihood		-78923.08	-78892.516	-82637. 767	-82622.22	
LR test		(Base Model)	dF=6 LR chi ² = 61.14**	(Base Model)	dF=3 LR chi ² = 31.09**	
Case Amount		42,276		44,174		
Countries		40		42		

Note : * P<0.1, ** P<0.05

Given the uniqueness of African countries, an analysis is conducted without those countries (see appendix table 4). As a result, most variables' significance and direction have not changed and the interaction term between inequality and general trust come to be significant. That is, the influence of general trust weakens in countries that have low levels of inequality.

Taken together, the results are generally in accordance with the hypothesis that the higher economic and political development, the bigger the positive influence of general trust and group membership, and the bigger the negative influence of confidence in government on non-institutional political participation.

Hierarchical Linear Model on Institutional Participation

Next, this research implements logistic HLM for the purpose of examining micro and macro conditions of institutional participation; that is voting (<Table 2>). Model 5 shows that all social variables are significant and have the same positive directions. With respect to state level variables, economic development and inequality are significant at a level of 90%. The higher the economic development and inequality, the lower voter turnout.

Model 6, which includes the interaction term between economy variables and social capital variables, demonstrates that confidence in government holds the same significance and direction. Meanwhile, we can see that general trust, group membership, and inequality's significance have disappeared. This means general trust and group membership affect voting in the social context. In other words, it might be misleading to examine the correlation between social capital and political participation, only at the individual level without consideration of macro variables. While they might positively relate to voting in some societies, it is equally possible that they do not relate to voting, or even negatively relate to voting in other societies. Inequality, also, affects whether to vote by the interaction with social capital variables, instead of direct influence.

Model 6 reveals that there are two different mechanisms in that economic development has to do with voting. To begin with, economic development, which is operationalized as GDP per capita, in itself negatively contributes to voting. Yet, it also positively contributes to voting via general trust and group membership. These results are generally in accordance with the mechanism which explains the relationship between economic development and non-institutional political participation. First, the mechanism through which general trust and group membership affect voting is not significantly different from non-institutional political participation. As people have more available resources, people are more likely to trust in each other, through which the norm of reciprocity is enhanced and people voluntarily share the cost of public goods (Park 2004). This in turn seems to motivate more people to vote. Furthermore, by participation, members of society are able to foster their democratic and civic virtues, and to get information about political issues with ease, as a result overall voter turnout might rise. In contrast, comparatively once homogenous and one-dimensional values of the public started to divide with economic development, institutions represented by government had trouble reflecting these divided values of the public. Because of this, the public is more likely to participate in direct action rather than trying to voice their opinions through institutions. This is the reason why economic development is positively linked with non-institutional political participation and negatively linked with voting.

According to model 7, the political model, it is verified that people having higher social capital have higher possibilities of voting. The political development level is negatively related with voting. Model 8, the political interaction model, reveals that confidence in the government, group membership and political development have the same significance and direction, and the significance of general trust has disappeared. All of the interaction terms show a significant positive direction.

**Table 2 Hierarchical Linear Analysis Result by
Applying Institutional Political Participation as Dependent Variable**

Variables		Model 5 (Economy Model)	Model 6 (Economy Interactive model)	Model 7 (Political Model)	Model 8 (Political interactive model)	
Control Variables	Sex (Male)	-0.027	-0.021	-0.017	-0.015	
	Age	0.043**	0.043**	0.042**	0.043**	
	Marital Status (Married)	0.647**	0.642**	0.640**	0.638**	
	Education	0.104**	0.102**	0.106**	0.105**	
	Employment (Employed)	0.503**	0.501**	0.493**	0.494**	
	Income	0.001	-0.001	0.001	0.000	
Social Capital	General Trust	0.178**	0.012	0.176**	0.012	
	Confidence in Government	0.183**	0.151**	0.184**	0.148**	
	Group Membership	0.040**	0.002	0.042**	0.019*	
National- level Variables	Economy Level (High=1)	-0.476*	-0.677**			
	Economic Inequality (Low=1)	0.484*	0.298			
	Mandatory Voting (Yes=1)	0.976**	0.939**	0.914**	0.908**	
	Political Development (High=1)			-0.379**	-0.649**	
Interaction Term	Economy Level	General Trust		0.249**		
		Confidence In Government		-0.005		
		Group Membership		0.100**		
	Economic Inequality	General Trust		0.066		
		Confidence In Government		0.070**		
		Group Membership		0.013		
	Political Development	General Trust				0.251**
		Confidence In Government				0.071**
		Group Membership				0.040**
Constant Term		-2.320**	-2.148**	-2.020**	-1.880**	
Random Part (State Level) Constant		.685	.695	.816	.821	
Log Likelihood		-18890.78	-18852.001	-19760.38	-19745.173	
LR test		(Base Model)	dF=6 LR chi ² = 77.56**	(Base Model)	dF=3 LR chi ² = 31.41**	
Case Amount		42,662		44,544		
Countries		38		40		

Note : * P<0.1, ** P<0.05

Given the uniqueness of African countries, an analysis is conducted without those countries (see appendix table 4). The entire variables' significance and direction have not changed in the economy interaction model. For the political interactive model, the significance of group membership and the

interaction term of confidence in government have disappeared.

In general, by examining the results provided above, it can be concluded that the more countries are economically and politically developed and the less countries suffer from inequality, the positive correlation between social capital variables and voting increases, which is in accordance with the hypothesis 2.

Difference among Country Groups

Next, in order to clarify countries' characteristics and differences in political participation, multi-dimensional scaling (MDS) and a cluster analysis are conducted (<Figure 7>). The following is a list of six included variables: general trust, confidence in government, group membership, GDP per capita, gini coefficient, and the rule of law. For general trust, confidence in government, and group membership, each country's average scores are used. The principal component analysis, which is conducted after MDS, shows that there are two different axes, which divides countries. The first axis is economic, political, and social development, and the second axis is confidence in the government, that is trust in institution.




Figure 7 - MDS Result Utilizing Country-level Variables

We can see the U-shape curve in the distribution of countries. Mainly African and Asian countries are located in the second quadrant, transitional countries are in the third and fourth quadrants, and Scandinavian countries, US, Canada, Australia and Switzerland are located in the first quadrant.

Given that confidence in the government comprehensively reflects various subcategories including legitimacy, practical competitiveness, and effectiveness, and that countries located in the second quadrant have a relatively low economic and political development level, high confidence in the government of these countries depends on the notion that the government and institutions represent the public realm, rather than the notion of practical competitiveness and effectiveness. Also, due to the lack of social division, social members' desires and urges are relatively homogenous and one-

dimensional; the government, in turn, is more likely to satiate the public's desires and urges.

Even though formal democracy is established, as society becomes more complex as a result of internal and external factors like globalization and urbanization, if the government fails to satisfy social members increasing expectations, confidence in the government decreases (Inglehart and Catterberg 2002). Countries located in the third quadrant are such countries. Countries located in the fourth quadrant can be characterized by being on the increase of legitimacy, effectiveness, and efficiency of government and institutions. In other words, we can see these countries as transitional countries, which actively respond to a changing society. Lastly, countries in the first quadrant are interpreted as countries successfully dealing with increasing social risks by effectively working governments and institutions. The cluster analysis also supports the country categorization provided above.

The next step examines patterns of political participation based on the groups of nations. Since the objective of this analysis is to see the differences among the groups, I conducted OLS (non-institutional political participation) and binary logistic regression (institutional political participation), instead of HLM (<Table 3>). This is because all countries belong to one of three groups, so controlling the state-level variables' influence is not necessary. I set 'low developed countries' as the base group since it has the most countries and cases (18 countries, 35,750 cases).

Table 3 - OLS and Logistic Regression Test Result

Variables		Non-institutional political participation model	Institutional political participation model
Social Capital	General trust	0.083**	0.309**
	Confidence in Government	-0.120**	0.104**
	Group Membership	0.143**	0.056**
State-level Variables	Advanced Countries	1.533**	-0.494**
	Transitional Countries	0.279**	-0.426**
	Low-developed Countries	(Base Group)	(Base Group)

Note : ** P<0.05, Full model are presented in appendix table-5.

The result suggests that those in advanced countries engage substantially more in non-institutional political participation than those in other countries, while they are less likely to vote than those in other countries. In broad terms, this confirms the prior interpretation that social and economic development lead to significant change in values, this in turn facilitates direct political action. It also confirms that institutions have trouble with resonating various change.

Conclusion

This study clarified the correlation between social capital and political development, and examined how the macro contexts including economic and political development, and economic inequality affect the correlation. Also, the moderation effects of macro variables were revealed using interaction terms.

The results demonstrated that social capital, which consists of general trust, confidence in government, and group membership, plays a significant role in institutional and non-institutional

political participation. Particularly, confidence in the government has a positive and negative effect on the institutional and non-institutional ones, respectively. For macro variables, economic development, which is operationalized as GDP per capita, has a negative and positive impact on the institutional and non-institutional ones, respectively. Meanwhile, high economic inequality operationalized as the gini coefficient hinders people from voting.

The analysis, with interaction terms, shows that economic and political development magnified the influence of social capital on non-institutional political participation in general, and that confidence in the government is more significant in relatively egalitarian countries than their counterparts. For institutional political participation, it is revealed that all macro variables enhance the significance of social capital. In particular, the significance of general trust, group membership and economic inequality has disappeared, and only interaction terms are significant in the economy interactive model. This result suggests that the macro-micro linkage analysis might be necessary when it comes to the examination of correlation between social capital and voting from now on. I also found that economic development affects voting in negative and positive ways at the same time. Economic development in itself has a negative impact on voting, yet it strengthens the significance of general trust and group membership, which in turn has positive impacts on voting. To sum up, macro-level variables magnify social capital's influence on institutional and non-institutional political participation.

This research provides two implications. First, this research proved that social capital has different impacts on political participation, depending on the social context in terms of social capital theory. Prior research which set political participation as the dependent variable tends to focus on the micro-level analysis utilizing the individual as a unit of analysis, or on the macro-level analysis utilizing the society as a unit of analysis. Yet, it has been revealed that social capital in itself has to do with political participation and its influence differs by a social context. I expect that this result will be able to be applied to future social capital research, which set other variables including health, income, quality of life, and so forth as the dependent variable. Macro variables' moderation effect would exist based on such variables.

The second is that this research considers micro-macro interactions in terms of methodology. Current social research in Korea tends to concentrate only on partial aspects - microscopic or macroscopic - of the society. Although these kinds of methodologies are meaningful in themselves, it is hard to reflect individuals' aspects under the social context. This research is meaningful in terms of trying to connect micro-macro variables through HLM, and examining social-level variables' contribution to individual level variables via other individual variables.

□ Appendix

Table 1 - Variables' Definition and Measurement

Variables		Definition / Measurement	Notes
Control Variables	Sex	-	Male=1
	Age	-	15~94
	Marriage	-	Married=1
	Education	The Highest educational level	1 to 9
	Employment	Regular, irregular work and self-employed	Having job=1
	Income	-	1 to 10
Social Capital	General Trust	A response to “Most people can be trusted”	Yes(trust)=1
	Confidence in Government	A response to “How much confidence do you have in the government?”	1 to 4
	Group Membership	Frequency of having group membership : sports/recreation, art/music/educational, environmental organization, charitable/humanitarian organization, consumer organization	0 to 5 (Cronbach's alpha =0.73)
GDP per capita		-	UN 2005
Gini Coefficient		-	Usable data in UN 2000~2010
The Rule of Law		The extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society; meaning political openness and democratic property.	World Governance Indicator “Rule of Law” 2005
Mandatory Voting		Countries having legal punishment on not voting (Australia, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Turkey)	CIA world fact book, International institute for democracy and electoral assistance
Non-institutional Political Participation		A composite variable of questions on ‘signing a petition’, ‘joining in boycotts’ and ‘attending peaceful demonstrations’. (have done = 2; might do = 1; would never do=0)	0 to 6 (Cronbach's alpha =0.78)
Voting		The latest election.	Voted =1

Table 2 - Descriptive Statistics

Variables	N	Average	S.D.	Min.	Max.
Sex (Male)	44174	0.49348	0.499963	0	1
Age	44174	42.17836	16.53109	15	97
Marital Status (Married)	44174	0.621633	0.484985	0	1
Education	44174	5.459841	2.393586	1	9
Employment (Employed)	44174	0.548988	0.4976	0	1
Income	44174	4.816883	2.278663	1	10
Social Capital					
General Trust	44174	0.264839	0.441253	0	1
Confidence in Government	44174	2.425884	0.902471	1	4
Group Membership	44174	1.360982	2.03952	0	10
National-level Variables					
GDP per capita	43260	15308.63	12796.02	636	47626
Gini Coefficient	42276	38.20319	10.1314	21.9	63.1
The Rule of Law	44174	0.591004	0.491654	0	1
Dependent Variables					
Non-institutional Political Participation	44174	2.106103	1.870019	0	6
Voting (voted=1)	44544	0.766635	0.422977	0	1

Note: These results based on non-institutional political participation-political model.

Table 3 – Variables’ National Averages and Values

Country	General Trust	Confidence In Government	Group Membership	GDP per capita	Gini Coefficient	Rule of Law	Non-institutional P. P.	Voting
Italy	0.33	2.05	1.28	28280	36.00	0.47	3.53	0.91
Spain	0.20	2.37	0.65	27392	34.70	1.10	2.54	.
USA	0.40	2.31	1.71	42516	40.80	1.53	3.50	0.78
Canada	0.43	2.29	2.10	35033	32.60	1.66	3.43	0.75
Japan	0.41	2.10	0.93	30441	32.90	1.24	2.62	0.78
Mexico	0.16	2.35	1.75	12191	48.30	-0.41	1.82	0.66
S Africa	0.17	2.84	1.76	8597	63.10	0.08	1.83	0.70
Australia	0.49	2.32	2.01	32719	33.60	1.71	3.54	0.96
Norway	0.76	2.54	1.78	47626	25.80	1.91	3.58	0.84
Sweden	0.69	2.35	2.04	32703	25.00	1.78	3.94	0.88
Finland	0.59	2.68	1.42	30708	26.90	1.95	2.72	0.78
S Korea	0.30	2.41	1.16	22783	31.40	0.97	2.47	0.76
Poland	0.20	1.94	0.64	13784	34.10	0.42	1.67	0.67
Switzerland	0.52	2.74	2.30	35784	33.70	1.90	3.52	0.75
Brazil	0.09	2.33	1.08	8509	54.70	-0.49	2.59	0.88
Chile	0.12	2.40	1.43	12663	52.10	1.27	1.38	0.73
India	0.23	2.61	4.39	2209	33.40	0.16	2.24	0.93
Slovenia	0.18	2.07	1.10	23476	31.20	0.85	2.29	0.73
Bulgaria	0.21	2.14	0.13	9809	28.20	-0.16	1.31	0.68
Romania	0.20	2.00	0.10	9361	30.00	-0.17	0.98	0.90
Taiwan	0.24	2.16	0.78	15599	34.00	1.01	1.01	0.76
Turkey	0.05	2.74	0.17	11465	39.00	0.16	1.44	0.75
Ukraine	0.29	2.08	0.51	5583	26.40	-0.79	1.35	0.88
Peru	0.06	1.79	1.01	6387	48.10	-0.74	2.11	0.91
Uruguay	0.29	2.66	0.65	9683	45.30	0.43	1.58	.
Ghana	0.08	2.94	2.17	1208	42.80	-0.14	1.44	0.81
Moldova	0.18	2.12	0.72	2362	33.00	-0.40	1.52	0.68
Georgia	0.19	2.12	0.05	3611	41.30	-0.73	1.25	0.78
Thailand	0.42	2.35	1.46	6675	40.00	0.09	0.55	0.94
Indonesia	0.42	2.56	2.11	3102	34.00	-0.82	1.21	0.90
Vietnam	0.53	3.80	0.91	2161	35.60	-0.24	0.65	0.92
Serbia	0.15	2.00	0.45	8517	27.80	-0.88	2.49	0.74
Morocco	0.13	2.63	0.46	3508	40.90	-0.12	1.68	0.39
Cyprus	0.13	2.57	0.86	24408	.	0.91	2.30	0.87
Trinidad and Tobago	0.04	2.13	1.77	20058	21.90	-0.09	2.44	0.69
Andorra	0.21	2.21	2.06	.	.	1.02	3.22	0.24
Malaysia	0.09	3.02	1.27	11544	46.20	0.58	0.92	0.54
Burkina Faso	0.13	2.43	0.74	1014	39.80	-0.51	2.70	0.62
Ethiopia	0.24	2.25	2.50	636	29.80	-0.86	2.45	0.87
Mali	0.20	2.93	3.11	885	33.00	-0.14	2.35	0.63
Zambia	0.11	2.41	2.36	1158	54.60	-0.58	2.12	0.66
Germany	0.35	2.00	0.96	31115	28.30	1.66	2.86	0.80
Total	0.26	2.43	1.36	15309	38.20	0.39	2.11	0.77

Note: These results based on non-institutional political participation-political model.

Table 4 - HLM Test Result (Excluding African Countries)

Variables		Non-institutional Political Participation and Economy Interaction Model	Non-institutional Political Participation and Political Interaction Model	Institutional Political Participation and Economy Interaction Model	Institutional Political Participation and Political Interaction Model	
Control Variables	Sex (Male)	0.162**	0.164**	-0.046	-0.033	
	Age	-0.003**	-0.002**	0.043**	0.042**	
	Marital Status (Married)	0.057**	0.047**	0.657**	0.648**	
	Education	0.140**	0.142**	0.102**	0.105**	
	Employment (Employed)	0.179**	0.184**	0.442**	0.430**	
	Income	0.019**	0.020**	0.011	0.013*	
Social Capital	General Trust	0.164**	0.074**	0.079	0.057	
	Confidence in Government	-0.035**	-0.033**	0.138**	0.196**	
	Group Membership	0.103**	0.080**	0.015	0.025	
National-level Variables	Economy Level (High=1)	1.206**		-0.630**		
	Economic Inequality (Low=1)	-0.062		0.213		
	Mandatory Voting (Yes=1)			0.918**	0.900**	
	Political Development (High=1)		0.703**		-0.559*	
Interaction Term	Economy Level	General Trust	0.195**		0.212**	
		Confidence In Government	0.024		-0.005	
		Group Membership	0.038**		0.073**	
	Economic Inequality	General Trust	-0.091*		0.030	
		Confidence In Government	-0.052**		0.079*	
		Group Membership	-0.001		0.028	
	Political Development	General Trust		0.193**		0.230**
		Confidence In Government		-0.052**		-0.013
		Group Membership		0.059**		0.064**
Constant Term		0.600**	0.641**	-2.125**	-1.945**	
Random part (State-level) Residual		.589	.770	.649	.801	
Residuals		1.527	1.536	-	-	
Log Likelihood		-64010.349	-67722.391	-14441.813	-15319.922	
Case Amount		34,697	36,595	34,357	36,239	
Countries		33	35	31	33	

Note : * P<0.1, ** P<0.05

Table 5 - OLS and Logistic Regression Test Result (Full Model)

Variables		Non-institutional Political Participation Model		Institutional Political Participation Model	
Control Variables	Sex (Male)	0.203**		-0.015	
	Age	-0.004**		0.042**	
	Marital Status (Married)	0.025		0.684**	
	Education	0.112**		0.126**	
	Employment (Employed)	0.178**		0.391**	
	Income	0.000		-0.016**	
Social Capital	General Trust	0.083**		0.309**	
	Confidence in Government	-0.120**		0.104**	
	Group Membership	0.143**		0.056**	
National-level Variables	Advanced Countries	1.533**		-0.494**	
	Transitional Countries	0.279**		-0.426**	
	Low-developed Countries	(Base group)		(Base group)	
Constant Term		1.144**		-1.750**	
Case Amount		43,260		43,612	
Significance		R ²	0.1863	Log Likelihood	-20,674.649

Note : * P<0.1, ** P<0.05

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